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ABSTRACT
Background: Reports that death notices in the Times-Picayune, the New Orleans daily newspaper,
increased dramatically in 2006 prompted local health officials to determine whether death notice
surveillance could serve as a valid alternative means to confirm suspicions of excess mortality requiring
immediate preventive actions and intervention.
Methods: Monthly totals of death notices from the Times-Picayune were used to obtain frequency and
proportion of deaths from January to June 2006. To validate this methodology the authors compared
2002 to 2003 monthly death frequency and proportions between death notices and top 10 causes of
death from state vital statistics.
Results: A significant (47%) increase in proportion of deaths was seen compared with the known
baseline population. From January to June 2006, there were on average 1317 deaths notices per
month for a mortality rate of 91.37 deaths per 100,000 population, compared with a 2002–2004
average of 924 deaths per month for a mortality rate of 62.17 deaths per 100,000 population.
Differences between 2002 and 2003 death notices and top 10 causes of death were insignificant and
had high correlation.
Discussion: Death notices from local daily newspaper sources may serve as an alternative source of
mortality information. Problems with delayed reporting, timely analysis, and interoperability between
state and local health departments may be solved by the implementation of electronic death registra-
tion. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2007;1:15–20)
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Editors’ Note: After not experiencing a major public health emergency in almost 100 years, the US is relearning the stark
realities that occur when a public health system is compromised and the pulse of a community is temporarily lost. In the
chaotic aftermath of Hurricane Katrina the impact on health, through its influence on infrastructure and the determinants
of health, subtly began to rear its ugly head. When the daily capacity to evaluate and monitor health indices fails, as it has
in New Orleans, morbidity and mortality remain unnoticed and uncounted. Predictably, vulnerable populations suffer the
most.
Stephens and his colleagues, alerted by the concerns of the citizenry, again took the pulse of the community and found that
the rate of death notices, as just 1 “imperfect” measure of excess mortality, was suspiciously elevated. Is this an ideal
population-based study? No, but both the question and the strength of this preliminary report are something that disaster
medicine specialists have been struggling with for decades. What do we need to know to prevent needless mortality and
morbidity while the public health system is recovering? How do we derive the essential information to guide health relief
efforts and measure the interaction between the human host and the compromised environment to prevent further harm
when the traditional system of assessing mortality is debilitated? The entire postdisaster surveillance system may have only
1 person doing essentially all of the tasks. What does this lone person do when resources are limited?
Our disaster medicine colleagues who respond to catastrophic public health emergencies worldwide have educated us on the
nuances of the prolonged effect that such disasters have on the community. Following the prototypical wars that destroyed
their countries’ public health infrastructure, the decay factors that cause preventable deaths continued for many years after
the shooting had stopped. Years later, retrospective studies recorded many more deaths from indirect causes, and those that
suffer the most typically are women, children, old people, and people with disabilities. Ninety percent of excess deaths were
preventable.
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The US is not a developing country, but the uncomfortable reality of the public health impact and management of Katrina is painfully
similar. The authors’ study has exposed that glaring deficiency—that an attentive and proactive surveillance and response mechanism is
justifiably obligated from state and federal agencies.
How can dependable mortality data be accessed whenthe usual means of data collection have been pro-foundly disrupted? Mortality data and health statis-
tics reports provide public health officials with critical insight
into the health status of a population. These data provide key
information for public health research, facilitate long-term
surveillance, and are commonly the basis for health inter-
ventions.1
The National Association for Public Health Statistics and
Information Systems is partnering with the National Center
for Health Statistics in a cooperative agreement to upgrade
all 50 states from paper-based to electronic death registration
systems (EDRS).2 A nationwide EDRS will facilitate rapid
reporting and interoperability between local, state, and national
health agencies, and will streamline the
vital records request process (G. Land,
personal communication, July 7, 2006 ).
This system is not currently in place to
address the immediate public health is-
sues from future disasters in Louisiana.3
Under normal circumstances, mortality
rates are derived from death certificates
registered at each state’s office of vital
records. Before Hurricane Katrina, the
Louisiana Department of Health and
Hospitals issued an annual health report
card, which included statistical reports
across various health indices, serving as
an overall evaluation of Louisiana’s
health. The most recently released
health report card was submitted to the
state legislature in March 2006 for the
2005 report; however, all of the mortal-
ity data presented in the state’s report date from 2003.4
The Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals Office of
Vital Statistics is responsible for processing requests for vital
record certificates, including birth, death, and marriage cer-
tificates, as well as generating statistical reports.5 The depart-
ment’s ability to function at full capacity was interrupted by
Hurricane Katrina. Only 80% of vital record certificates were
moved from the flooded basement of the New Orleans State
Office Building to a floor higher in the building before the
flooding. The majority of these certificates were birth records.
The Office of Vital Statistics is operating at nearly half the
pre-Katrina capacity, with a reduction from 87 employees to
a current staff of 51 employees. Furthermore, a majority of
this workforce is temporary and/or new employees. Although
the staff has been significantly reduced, the requests for
documents have markedly increased from 300,000 requests in
2004 to 534,936 requests within the last year.6 Operations for
the Office of Vital Statistics have been relocated from New
Orleans since the storm and are now divided between Baton
Rouge6 and Metairie.7 Consequently, the ability of the Lou-
isiana Department of Health and Hospitals Office of Vital
Statistics to generate accurate and timely statistical reports,
in light of these myriad factors, is compromised.
The floodwaters caused by Hurricane Katrina have had a
lasting impact on the health system of New Orleans and its
surrounding parishes. Only 15 of 22 area hospitals have
reopened, with less than half the number of prestorm beds.8
A significant portion of the population is still living in
substandard conditions, contributing to the reported pervasive,
unmitigated stress among residents.9,10 As such, health officials
fear there will be increases in morbidity and mortality.8 Given
the compromised mechanism for register-
ing local deaths, there is a demonstrated
need for alternative means of generating
mortality information and indices. Death
notices in the Times-Picayune, the greater
New Orleans daily newspaper, increased
dramatically in 2006.10 In the absence of
an EDRS and current, verified vital sta-
tistics from the state, the present study
attempts to use extrapolated daily news-
paper death notices as a valid alternative
to the conventional but deficient registra-
tion system, and in so doing, determine a
workable mortality rate for greater New
Orleans in the aftermath of Hurricane
Katrina.
METHODS
The source for 2006 mortality data was
the Times-Picayune, which maintains a
Web site that contains a 6-month backlog of death notices.11
The Times-Picayune receives death notices via a passive data
collection mechanism: funeral directors and families of de-
ceased not using funeral homes may submit death notices via
e-mail or fax. Death notices for the years 2002 to 2003 were
obtained from the NewsBank, Inc, online database through the
New Orleans Public Library12 to establish a baseline mortality
rate. Death notices from the Times-Picayune were counted per
month for the years 2002 to 2003 and for the months of January
to June 2006.
For a standard of comparison, the number of deaths were
obtained from the Louisiana Office of Public Health, State
Center for Health Statistics for the greater New Orleans area
that includes Orleans, Jefferson, Plaquemines, Saint Bernard,
Saint Charles, Saint James, Saint John the Baptist, Saint
Tammany, Tangipahoa, and Washington parishes. Monthly
mortality data representing the top 10 causes of death for the
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greater New Orleans area were obtained for the years 2002 to
2003 from the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals
Health Statistics Center. These datasets were extrapolated
from data available on the department’s Web site.13 Top 10
causes of death is used in place of total mortality because data
on total mortality were not available at the parish level.
In a stable, open population, an estimate of the mid-year
population serves as the denominator of a mortality rate.
Therefore, mid-year population estimates were used for de-
nominator data for the 2 baseline years, 2002 and 2003.14 At
the time the present study was carried out, the only popula-
tion estimate available for greater New Orleans was from
January 2006.9 Therefore, this population was used to repre-
sent the denominator for the mortality calculations from
January to June 2006.
To limit the effects of potential confounders on the results,
the authors excluded death notices that reported an out-of-
state death, an out-of-greater New Or-
leans (but still within Louisiana) death, a
death that occurred during Hurricane
Katrina but was reported after January 1,
2006, or a duplicate entry death. Because
removing all of these entries would re-
quire reading each death notice in detail,
the authors sampled 1 week of death no-
tices in the middle of each month, to-
taled the number of death notices that
satisfied exclusion criteria, and averaged
the number over the 6-month period.
To determine whether the newspaper
death notice and official state datasets
were correlated, the authors compared
mortality rates during the period of 2002
to 2003 for each dataset. To detect any significant change in
mortality across 2002 to 2003, mortality rates from 2002 were
compared to 2003 for each data source. These analyses were
performed separately. Death notices were compared with
death notices and state data were compared with state data
across the 2-year period to test the integrity of the data
source. Mortality rates derived from the Times-Picayune death
notices in the first 6 months of 2006 were compared with
those from 2002 to 2003 (pre-Katrina). Data entry and tests
of statistical significance and correlation were done using
Microsoft Excel 2002 (Microsoft, Inc, Redmond, WA).
RESULTS
Total death notices from January to June 2006 and death
notices meeting exclusion criteria during the same period are
described in Table 1. The resulting number for mortality rate
calculation is included in Table 2.
Average monthly mortality rates for 2002 to 2003, calculated
from Louisiana state data and Times-Picayune death notices
using the greater New Orleans pre-Katrina population esti-
mates from those years, are compared in Figure 1. The r value
for correlation between the mortality rates derived from the
2 datasets is .6563, representing a significant (large positive)
correlation.
The strong correlation gave validity to the death notices as a
reasonable alternative to determine post-Katrina mortality
and make comparisons with pre-Katrina mortality. A base-
line average of deaths per month from January to June and
the mortality rates based on pre-Katrina greater New Orleans
population estimates are compared with mortality rates dur-
ing the same months in 2006 on the post-Katrina greater
New Orleans population estimate. Confidence intervals for
mean mortality rates were calculated for both periods (Table
2). The paired Student t test was used to test significance
between the sample means. The t value was not statistically
significant (P  .354), proving the hypothesis that there was
no difference between the means of the 2 datasets.
The post-Katrina mortality rate for the first 6 months of
2006 was approximately 91.37
deaths per 100,000 population; com-
pared to the pre-Katrina population
mortality rate of 62.17 deaths per
100,000 population, this represents
an average 47% increase from the
baseline mortality, suggesting a
marked increase in indirect (excess)
deaths postdisaster (Figure 2). Al-
though the confidence interval
around the 2006 mean is wide, there
is little overlap with the 2002 to
2003 confidence interval, suggesting
a significant difference in the mor-
tality distributions between the 2
populations.
DISCUSSION
The significant increase in proportion of deaths in the first 6
months of 2006 supports the civilian population’s suspicions
about the enduring health consequences of the hurricane.
This major natural disaster resulted in a severe compromise of
the public health infrastructure, the loss of health care facil-
TABLE 1
Frequency of Death Notices by Inclusion and Exclusion
Criteria, 2006
January February March April May June
Total death notices 1589 1301 1418 1214 1194 1185
Excluding
Katrina deaths 1558 1270 1387 1183 1163 1154
Excluding
out-of-LA deaths 1427 1139 1256 1052 1032 1023
Excluding duplicate
entries 1206 918 1035 831 811 802
Excluding out-of-10
parish deaths 1108 820 937 733 713 704
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ities and the ability to deliver care, and a chaotic shift in a
major metropolitan population. Furthermore, it disabled the
ability of the state to perform optimal evaluation and mon-
itoring studies. Such sequelae characteristically prolong pub-
lic health emergencies and allow for conditions that are ripe
for indirect effects leading to increased mortality and mor-
bidity, data that are often unnoticed and uncounted.
Excess death studies, especially those performed during
large-scale public health emergencies, risk inherent loss of
the stringent evaluation and monitoring standards that are
expected during less chaotic times. Whereas death rate
reports may prove alarming, they must first alert decision
makers to rally resources to intervene where prevention of
further deaths are most likely and to develop robust eval-
uation and monitoring programs to identify and verify the
exact nature of possible excess mortality and the most
vulnerable of subpopulations experiencing mortality and
morbidity. There is an urgent need to understand the
etiology of the problem so that local, state, and federal
health agencies can better prepare for and anticipate fu-
ture public health emergencies. The present study raises
this concern in the post-Katrina greater New Orleans
population and suggests an urgent need for further study to
investigate the causes and age distribution of these excess
deaths. It is a call to action to federal and Louisiana state
health authorities to direct the necessary resources to
determine and monitor these causes.
Immediately following disasters, public health officials need
reliable sources of mortality information to determine direct
and indirect consequences, particularly when traditional
health information systems are debilitated. In this study, an
alternative source of mortality information—death notices
published in the daily metropolitan newspaper, the Times-
Picayune—was found to correlate highly with mortality data
from the conventional state health information system in the
pre-Katrina population. The r value of .66 likely underesti-
mates the strength of the correlation because there is a slight
curvilinear relationship between the 2 datasets due to the
seasonal variability of the deaths over the year. The authors
FIGURE 1
Comparison of average monthly mortality rates for
2002–2003, Louisiana state data vs Times-Picayune
death notices FIGURE 2
Comparison of average mortality rates between
January–June 2006 and January–June 2002–2003,
Times-Picayune death notices
TABLE 2














Jan 1037.5 1,481,393 0.070 70.04 1108 914,745 0.121 121.13
Feb 864.5 1,481,393 0.058 58.36 820 914,745 0.090 89.64
Mar 986.5 1,481,393 0.067 66.59 937 914,745 0.102 102.43
Apr 887 1,481,393 0.060 59.88 733 914,745 0.080 80.13
May 885 1,481,393 0.060 59.74 713 914,745 0.078 77.95
Jun 865 1,481,393 0.058 58.39 704 914,745 0.077 76.96




Abbreviations: NO, New Orleans; CI, confidence interval.
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believe that this study validates this alternative source in this
population, and was thus a reliable source of mortality infor-
mation during a period in a disaster when the traditional
mortality data–collecting mechanism was incapacitated. Fur-
thermore, death notice monitoring provided real-time mor-
tality information well ahead of official state health informa-
tion mortality data, giving impetus to the Louisiana health
departments to adopt an interoperable statewide EDRS to
rapidly assess and monitor mortality.
Strengths
The exclusion criteria of this study eliminated 2006 death
notices that did not occur in the specified geographic area of
the study or within the specified time frame of the study
(Table 1). This was done to eliminate death notices that may
artificially inflate the 2006 mortality rate calculation. Elim-
inating death notices by using strict exclusion criteria would
likely result in a conservative estimation of true mortality rates
in the first 6 months of 2006. It should be noted that before
Katrina, the Times-Picayune offered both paid and free death
notices, whereas after the storm they only offered paid death
notices. This difference would also likely result in an artificially
reduced number of death notices and minimize the likelihood of
an inflated mortality rate in the first 6 months of 2006.
Limitations
The data source for current mortality, the Times-Picayune,
uses a passive data collection system. This would likely result
in underreporting of the true mortality because there are
deaths that occur in the area that are not published as death
notices in the Times-Picayune. Underreporting of mortality
would result in an underestimation of current mortality rates,
making the results of this study even more alarming.
The study source for the population of greater New Orleans
provides only an estimate for January 2006, and the authors
necessarily used this population estimate in the denominator
data for mortality rate calculations for each month of 2006.
However, according to recent data, the population of greater
New Orleans has been exceptionally dynamic and growing
steadily (demonstrated in data collected through May 2006). 9,15
If the population of greater New Orleans did increase in the first
6 months of 2006, the calculations of mortality rates will over-
estimate the true mortality rate over the first 6 months of 2006
by virtue of underestimating the true population.
There may be demographic differences, particularly in age
distribution, between the pre-Katrina and post-Katrina pop-
ulations of greater New Orleans. The 2006 population of
greater New Orleans may have a disproportionate number of
older adults and therefore a higher death rate. The authors did
not adjust for age in their mortality calculations. The degree to
which changing demographics affected the results of this study
cannot be known until further studies investigating the current
demographics of greater New Orleans are carried out.
CONCLUSIONS
A significant increase in the mortality rate for the first 6 months
of 2006 substantiates the deleterious effects of enduring health
consequences resulting from a major disaster. This must be
understood as an urgent call for further studies and subsequent
interventions. The authors believe that the underlying causes
of the increased mortality rates within the greater New Or-
leans’ population are complex, multifactorial, and persistent.
This disaster severely compromised the public health infra-
structure. It is suggested that a destroyed or poorly recovered
public health infrastructure, which normally would be able to
identify health problems and protect the health of a popula-
tion, has in fact contributed to excess mortality.
Finally, the necessity to set standards that will open the lines
of communication across public health agencies in the event
of a disaster is clearly indicated.16 Interagency communica-
tion can deteriorate rapidly in the midst of a disaster; each
office is often solely focused on meeting its own needs and
thereby unavailable to provide information across jurisdic-
tions. Offices were flooded, paper records had to be rerouted,
and only a fraction of office staff returned to work. This
confluence of events reveals the urgent need for states to
adopt electronic reporting systems.
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